Coming into World War I, Britain was in support of the existence of the Ottoman Empire. Britain was in control of the Suez Canal, the only true major portal into and out of the Mediterranean Sea. Having the Ottomans as a buffer between Germany and Russia kept Britain’s interests in the Suez Canal steady. But when the Ottomans joined sides with Germany in the War, Britain was forced to fight against the Ottomans, ultimately endangering Britain’s strategic ownership of Egypt. Britain realized to not be in alliance with the Middle Eastern Arabs, would mean Britain would have no buffer between the Suez Canal and the Central Powers. But, having the Middle Eastern Arabs on their side would allow Britain to have a significant advantage over the Ottomans, because it would force the Arabs in Turkey to fight against the Arabs in the Middle East, weakening the Turkish Empire farther. Britain and the Arabs began to negotiate terms for which the Arabs would revolt against the Ottomans. These negotiations ultimately became one of the starting points for issues in the Middle East that pursue through today.
On July 14th 1915, Sayyid Hussein bin Ali also known as “the Sherif of Mecca” wrote a letter to Sir Henry McMahon, who was the High Commissioner at Cairo. This letter was the first of eight letters, dated from July 14th 1915-January 25, 1916. The letters negotiate the Arab’s terms in order to support Great Britain against the Ottoman Empire. In letter one, Hussein defines the wishes of the Arabs: That “England acknowledges the independence of the Arab countries” and that “England acknowledges the abolition of foreign privileges in Arab countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an International Convention for confirming such abolition.” The letter shows that the Arabs motive for abolishing foreign control on its lands (I.E. the Ottomans) was for the requirement of independence in its lands. As the letters progress, the attitudes and the complete goals of Britain seem wishy-washy and undefined. In letter two, McMahon thanks Hussein for his support of Britain, but does not acknowledge the requirements that were presented. This in turn required Hussein in letter three to call Britain out on their “ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to [their] essential point” ; which is of course, independence. McMahon’s response in letter four is that “it appeared to [him] that the time had not yet come when that question could be discussed in a conclusive manner.” The question is, if Hussein’s requirements for revolting against the Ottomans were clearly on the grounds of independence, why would McMahon suggest that the terms be discussed later? McMahon eventually does state what Britain was willing to give and allow the new Arab nation to possess. However, one does get the sense that Britain did not want to negotiate the Arabs independence until a later time. It might be suggested that Britain just wanted the Arabs help against the Ottomans, and then discuss terms after (fight now, talk later); perhaps even after the war was over. The most significant portion of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence are from the fourth letter, dated to October 24th, 1916. Britain states what geographical lands they will allow to be part of the new Arab nation, and what would still remain under British control. Britain goes on to say “…Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.”
In summary, the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence provides the grounds for why the Arabs would revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The result, according to the Arabs and Britain, would be Arab Independence and the formation of a new Arab country, with Britain supporting their action to do so. However, one key geographical area was not discussed: Palestine.
From the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, geographical boundaries are defined and understood. However, if one looks at the so called understood divisions, a problem is found. Figure 1 is a map of Palestine under the Ottoman Empire in 1915. These districts and the geopolitical terms are the ones that must have been understood between Hussein and McMahon in the Correspondence letters. Therefore, because these areas were already an Arab population under Ottoman rule, it is logical to say that Hussein had the understanding that these same lands (from the 37th degree north to the Red Sea in the south, to the Persian Gulf in the East ) would come under his power after the war was over. After the October 24th letter and the agreements that followed, based on a literal understanding of Britain’s exclusions from Arab control, the boundaries would exclude areas in the north: “the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of Damascus, Hone, Hama, and Allepo…should be excluded from the areas of demand.” Figure 2 is a map of the literal boundaries defined by Britain, including its exclusions . A close look at this map shows that the area of Palestine would belong to the Arabs. It is logical to suggest that Hussein agreed to revolt against the ottomans on the condition of independence for geological land in areas of predominate Arab populations, including Palestine.
The question needs to be asked: was this what Britain had in mind? Did Britain agree to give the land of Palestine over to Arab control? Britain seems to agree with what could be in line with the Arab understanding of the letters. Yet, as was shown, even as early on as letter two, Britain does not seem to want to deal with the results of the Arab Revolt, they just want the Revolt to happen. With a careful re-reading of the October 24th letter, one can see a slight mishap that could lead to mass confusion: Britain never defines its southern boundary. Britain states they want to maintain control of the lands “west of Damascus, Hone, Hama, and Allepo”, but never actually define how far south the line runs. Hussein must have assumed the southern border would run west from Damascus and end there, because that is the last city mentioned by McMahon. Had Britain, after World War One and the Arab revolt was over, done exactly what it suggested, that is, had it defined the boundaries as west of Damascus and no farther south of it (figure 2), then it would be safe to say that is what Britain had understood when it agreed with the negotiations.
All of this climaxes to what would leave any person on the edge of their seat in any good thriller. The letters had been sent and done. Hussein and the Arabs had their understanding that if they revolted against the Ottomans, Britain would back them in their quest for an Arab state “unified Arab state stretching from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden (Yemen)”, including Palestine. The British seem to be in agreement with all of this. As a result, Hussein called for the Arabs to rise up, and the Arab Revolt began in June, 1916 and ended in 1918.
However, in January of 1916 (officially passed in May), the British and the French had come to an agreement that became known as “the Sykes-Picot Agreement”. In this agreement, they divided up the lands into areas of British and French control (figure 3), and had made Palestine into a National Condominium. Lloyd George said that “a regime in the Holy Land ‘would be quite intolerable to ourselves…Palestine is really the strategic buffer of Egypt”. By leaving Palestine as a National Condominium, Britain left its control of the Suez Canal vulnerable. Britain needed to change the Sykes-Picot agreement in some fashion to give itself access to Palestine. With “the signatures not yet dry on the [Sykes-Picot Agreement]”, Britain began to find a way to accomplish this. The answer was with the Jews.
On November 2nd, 1917, Britain released a statement known as “the Belfour Declaration”. In this statement, they promise to allow the Jews to establish a Jewish National Home with Britain backing them up. The home would be in Palestine. This was done in order to give Britain continuous access into Palestine, ultimately in order to protect the Suez Canal. While Britain was making other agreements with France and the Jews, the Arabs had already started a revolt that they could not go back on; a revolt that started on the belief of independence in lands that Britain was giving away.
All of this eventually came to a head and exploded. Even through today, the end is still yet to be found. The Arabs proved their agreement and understanding of the McMahon-Hussein Agreement by the simple fact that they revolted. But the issue is far more complex from Britain’s point of few. As the saying goes, actions speak louder than words. Within months of the Correspondents ending and on through the Arab revolt, Britain was already dealing with France and eventually the Jews on what to do with the Middle Eastern lands. This is proof that Britain did not view the McMahon-Hussein Agreements the same way Sayyid Hussein bin Ali did. Both sides came to different understandings of the same agreement.
In Britain’s defense of its actions and dealings, they do have logical explanations as to why they did what they did. The Arabs believe Britain did not follow through with their promise. But Britain has many claims to suggest that the Arabs misunderstood those promises. As was shown to be true, Britain had dealings with France before and during the duration of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. The alliance with France was the reason why Britain could not take a full stance in agreement with the Arabs on lands partitions just yet. Also, the agreement that the Arab nations did agree to- that is revolution for independence- clearly shows that they needed British support to do so. “The term independence was merely a euphemism for supersession of Turkish rule by British and French in their respective spheres of interests.” Hussein must have had some understanding of what Britain’s intentions were, or else he would not have sought their support in the first place, for acknowledging that the Arab’s could not successfully revolt against the Ottomans unless the British were involved, means Hussein understood they were not free of the World Super powers of that time. Therefore, giving Britain the upper hand in negotiations; meaning what the British ultimately thought was agreed upon was important, not the Arabs understandings. “It was [the Arabs] who remained in debt [to the British], not the British.” In the end, the McMahon Correspondence holds no merit and Britain is not bound to them. “Neither Britain’s Allies, signatories to the Asia Minor Agreement, or the League of Nations endorsed it. From the point of view of international Law, the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence [have] no validity.”
When the dust had settled, the results of British policy with the Arabs leading up to and through World War I in the end had a significant impact on Palestine for the rest of the century. The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence led to the Arab Revolt of 1916. The Arabs acted in their own interests under the pretense of gaining independence and establishing an Arab nation with the authority of the British. The British negotiated and acted in light of their interest; ultimately to continue control of the Suez Canal. Britain’s previous negotiations with France and the Allied forces made Britain understand the McMahon-Hussein correspondence with less significance and an all together different understanding then the Arabs did. So the Arabs viewed the Sykes-Picot and Belfour Declaration as contradictory to the McMahon-Hussein Agreements, but Britain did not. Britain was forced to give France its interests in the Middle East, and saw in its own manner, the development of a Jewish National Home as the best way to keep its own interests in Palestine. Today, history shows that Britain did have the upper hand to call the shots, and played the situation to their advantage. Lieutenant T. E. Lawrence wrote “Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants.” However, no one can prove or disprove that it was Britain’s intentions to trick the Arabs into revolting for a cause that would not happen; Britain could not have known the future. Simply put, both sides agreed upon a lack of understanding of the other by not clarifying. The only safe conclusion to be drawn is that if the terms would had been negotiated more precisely and clearly, things today could possibly be dramatically different in the Middle East.
Works Cited
Friedman, Isaiah. The Question of Palestine. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
Kaplan, Jonathan. The Zionist Movement Volume II Selected Organizational and Political Documents. Jerusalem, 1983.
Lawrence, T. E. Revolt in the Desert. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1927.
Palestine Remembered. 17 December 2001. 17 March 2011
Sachar, Howard M. A History of Israel From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996.
Spencer, William. The Islamic States in Conflict. New York: Franklin Watts, 1983.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 17th March 2011
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After the publications description was released, 